Competing Ideas of Empire:
British Perceptions of their Six Nations Allies in the Seven Years’ War

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Abstract
The Six Nations Iroquois played a crucial role for the British during the Seven Years’ War by relaying important information, guarding posts, and defending borders. This paper analyzes four main primary sources published by men in direct contact with the Six Nations during the war: Superintendent of Northern Indian Affairs William Johnson, British General Charles Lee, University of Pennsylvania Provost William Smith, and plantation owner and British soldier Peter Williamson. Contrary to what historians have previously suggested, this paper argues that there was not a single British perception of their Six Nations allies during the Seven Years’ War. Instead, there was a conflict within imperial ideology circulating among prominent British individuals. During and immediately after the conflict, British society continued to hold competing opinions on the uncertain position Indigenous peoples occupied in British North America.

Keywords: Six Nations Iroquois, Seven Years’ War, British North America, colonialism, indigenous history

The Six Nations Iroquois played a crucial role for the British during the Seven Years’ War, despite their committed efforts to maintain neutrality and avoid “raising the hatchet” against the French for the majority of the conflict. The Six Nations contributed by relaying important information, guarding posts, defending borders, and performing various other duties during the war as British allies. After 1755, Sir William Johnson was the primary British official to conduct diplomatic meetings with the Six Nations, but he was not their only contact. For scholars to appreciate fully the intricate relationships held between the British and their Six Nations allies, it is imperative to


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understand how they perceived one another. Contrary to what historians have previously suggested, this paper reveals that there was not a universal British opinion of the Six Nations Iroquois, and that competing perceptions of Indigenous peoples existed within British imperial ideology.

Men in direct contact with the Six Nations published the four primary sources this paper analyses. The four sources include an account of treaty conferences held between William Johnson, the Superintendent of Northern Indian Affairs, and several sachems of the Six Nations in 1755 and 1756; two published letters from British General Charles Lee to Lord Charlemont in 1761 to convince him of the importance of keeping all of Canada from the French; an account of the Iroquois and other North American Indians written in 1754 by William Smith, the first provost of the University of Pennsylvania; and an autobiography written in 1758 by Peter Williamson, a plantation owner and British soldier who was taken prisoner by a group of Cherokee warriors and who had contact with some Six Nations warriors during his time in combat.

Historian Fred Anderson explained that the Great League of Peace and Power was a cultural and ritual group that loosely united the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca peoples that made up the original Five Nations Iroquois. Anderson argued that the cultural bond of the Great League of Peace and Power formed the basis for the Iroquois Confederacy, which was a political union that formed in response to the appearance of European traders and settlers in the seventeenth century. Their new European neighbours then influenced the creation of subdivisions within each of the five nations as they split into Francophile, Anglophone, or neutral factions. The Anglophone groups formed the Covenant Chain with the government of New York in 1677, and eventually with Virginia and New England as well. In 1701, these factions came together and drew a truce, and the Five Nations’ diplomats made a peace treaty with the French at Montreal and renewed their Covenant Chain with the English. According to Anderson, “these agreements, known as the Grand Settlement of 1701, preserved the Five Nations’ independence and inaugurated a new era of neutrality in Iroquois diplomacy.” The Tuscaroras migrated into the upper Susquehanna Valley and joined as the sixth nation in 1722.

Although the Six Nations chose neutrality for the most part during the Seven Years’ War, their active participation began in September of 1753, when Tanaghrisson, an Ohio Iroquois headman, told a French force that their creation of French posts in the area would not be tolerated. Tanaghrisson asserted this message even though he was not authorized to speak for the Ohio Iroquois by the Confederacy. Six months later, Tanaghrisson accompanied Washington’s attack on Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville’s force. Although joining Washington’s offense may have been the first “hatchet” raised by Iroquois warriors against the French, the first battle in which a significant number of Six Nations actively participated was in September of 1755, when William Johnson commanded an army to lay siege on the French Fort Saint-Frédéric on Lake Champlain. Johnson’s army was mainly comprised of New England provincials, but were also joined by two hundred Mohawks. Unfortunately, the Mohawks suffered high casualties at the Battle of Lake George, and their main leader, Theyanoguin (Hendrick), was killed.

For the next four years, other than a small party of Oneidas and some limited participation from the Mohawk nation, the Six Nations did not actively fight in the war. Historian Timothy Shannon has explained that Iroquois warriors went to war to gain trophies and goods, to assert their manhood, and to gain captives to replace lost members of their communities. Thus, large-scale battles that cost the Iroquois high numbers of casualties, such as that at Lake George, defeated the purpose of fighting in the Seven Years’ War. Furthermore, losing Theyanoguin, a prominent Mohawk leader, would have made the war much less appealing.

The Six Nations’ active involvement in the war did, however, increase in 1759. Anderson argued that Onondaga representatives offered Johnson military aid against Fort Niagara due to their growing fear of the Delawares and Shawnees creating an independent Indian confederacy in the west. Shannon, however, attributed the transition from neutrality to active contribution to a deepening reliance on the political and other benefits that the British offered such as clothing, rewards for scalps, medicine, and other provisions. Whatever the motivation, approximately one thousand Iroquois warriors joined commanding officer Brigadier General John Prideux and Johnson to Niagara.

Therefore, throughout the Seven Years’ War, the Iroquois maintained their neutrality as much as possible, and when

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2 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America (New York: Random House, 2000), 12.
3 Ibid., 13.
4 Ibid., 14.
5 Ibid., 15.
they did engage in active warfare, they were motivated by their own interests.

This close proximity of the Six Nations Iroquois and the British during the Seven Years’ War led to contrasting perceptions held by the British of their Indigenous allies. Indeed, all four authors of the primary sources had unique experiences with the Six Nations Iroquois: William Johnson, called Warraghiyagey by his Six Nations allies, dealt extensively with the Iroquois in diplomatic measures;

General Charles Lee fought alongside some Mohawk warriors as well as married the daughter of a Seneca chief; William Smith lived in close proximity with the Iroquois in Pennsylvania and as an Anglican clergyman, he worked to convert some Indigenous people; and Peter Williamson dealt with Six Nations allies during his time enlisted in a British regiment. As a result of these interactions, different perceptions of the Six Nations emerged, including conflicting opinions of their warfare ability, their value as allies to the British, and their status as an independent or dependent nation. The most obvious opinion in competition among these men was in regard to the overall character of the Six Nations’ Iroquois.

According to Shannon, “all actors in the Seven Years’ War moved within parameters set by their cultural backgrounds; the rules of war, the meaning of victory or defeat, and the definition of atrocity all differed across cultural lines.” Thus, what may have seemed atrocious behaviour to one group, may have been honourable to another. The four documents clearly display biases informed by British culture, but the British men did not agree on whether the Six Nations were a peaceful or barbarous group of people. Charles Lee and William Johnson seem to have held them in high esteem, as both commented on the Six Nations’ sagacity. Johnson assured Iroquois sachems that they and the British were “linked . . . in mutual friendship and mutual affection.” William Smith took this admiration of the Six Nations the furthest, and perceived Britain’s Indigenous allies as “the greatest Peace-lovers” who “esteem peace the greatest Blessing under Heaven.” To support this notion, Smith provided various examples of the apparently abounding love of peace among the Six Nations, including their “burying of the Hatchet, or Axe of War; the planting of the Tree of Peace, together with dancing and singing of Peace-Songs.” He also argued that “nor, in Time of Peace, have the most generous Britons ever outshone them, in Acts of Humanity,Hospitality, Justice and Sincerity,” so much so that they would even rather starve themselves than see their prisoners go unfed.

Johnson, Lee, and especially Smith wrote of the Six Nations as an admirable people.

In stark contrast to these positive descriptions of the Six Nations was Peter Williamson’s arguments regarding the character of the “savages.” In his theatrical autobiography, he claimed that in early October of 1754, twelve Cherokee warriors ravaged his house and took him prisoner. He asserted various claims about the character of all North American Indians in general, including the Cherokee, the Six Nations, and even France’s Indigenous allies whom he witnessed at Oswego throughout his account. Williamson referred to Indigenous peoples as “Savages,” “hellish Monsters,” and “infernal beings.” He also dramatically argued that “Terrible and shocking to human Nature, were the Barbarities daily committed by the Savages, and are not to be paralleld in all the Volumes of History!” Unlike Smith, who assured readers that North American Indians took the greatest care of their prisoners, Williamson claimed that when the weather worsened during the winter, his captors kept him barely fed and took his clothing for themselves in return for a small blanket.

He also wrote that they mercilessly tortured him with beatings and fire, and dried his silent tears by applying burning coals and sticks on his cheeks with “a deal of monstrous Pleasure and Satisfaction.” The language used to describe the Six Nations, or all North American Indians, evidences that not all British people perceived these allies in the same manner. The views of Smith and Williamson were especially contradictory, yet both articulated their opinions with great certainty.

The British opinion of the Six Nations’ military capability was equally disparate. The four men viewed the Six Nations Iroquois as capable warriors, but ascribed their wartime success to different factors. Though Smith argued that they were peace-lovers, he also wrote that “at the same Time, they are, perhaps, the fiercest and boldest Warriors, on the face of the Earth.” He attributed this ferocity to their “Spirit of Heroism” and “Love of Liberty,” and argued that their wartime practices were “not inferior to the Honours of a Roman Triumph.” While he did not deny the Six Nations’ supposed aggressiveness, he

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17 William Smith, Some Account of the North-American Indians (London, 1754), 44.
18 Peter Williamson, French and Indian Cruelty (York, 1758).
21 William Smith, Some Account of the North-American Indians, 24-25.
22 Ibid., 27.
23 Ibid., 24.
24 Peter Williamson, French and Indian Cruelty, 10, 15.
25 Ibid., 10.
26 Ibid., 24.
27 Ibid., 14.
29 Ibid.
associated it with honourable fighting rather than savagery. Lee detailed Britain’s Indigenous allies’ warfare ability and argued that they were able warriors, but accredited their wartime success not to an underlying character of heroism, but to distinct geographical and lifestyle benefits that Indigenous peoples had. For instance, he explained that because they were nomadic peoples, they could rely on their hunting skills and knowledge of herbs and fruit to live while skulking around enemies’ permanent settlements. Lee wrote, “the advantage this gives them over us is infinite and obvious; this indeed it is which renders them invincible.” He also commented on their practice of taking prisoners to replace lost members: “There perhaps never was a more exquisite piece of policy . . . [because] by these means the number of their enemy is decreased, their own augmented, and consequently their power.” Lee recognized the Six Nations’ ability in war as a direct result of their policy-making and unique style of warfare.

Unlike Lee, William Johnson did not argue that the Six Nations’ wartime success was a result of living an Indigenous lifestyle, as he assured a Mohawk sachem that he and his warriors were superior to the Indians allied with the French. This argument is not surprising given that he made that claim to convince the Mohawks to stop the Delaware and Shawnee from fighting English settlers. In stark contrast to these more positive explanations of the Six Nations’ superior abilities was Williamson’s description. Williamson relied on further notions of barbarity, and ascribed Six Nations’ military success to their “great Fortitude in enduring Tortures and Death.” He argued that because all Indians were “the most implacably vindictive People upon the Earth [and] revenge the Death of any Relation,” they had an increased ability to tolerate pain and the damages of war. Therefore, while all four men argued that the Six Nations were able warriors, their explanations to justify this ability varied greatly; Smith focused on noble heroism, Lee on tactics and policies, Johnson on their general superiority over other Indians, and Williamson on all Indigenous peoples’ barbaric ability to endure suffering.

While Smith, Johnson, Lee, and Williamson all recognized the Six Nations’ warfare ability, they did not all believe that Britain should rely on them as allies in the Seven Years’ War. Shannon argues that “when Iroquois warriors failed to materialize for expeditions or abandoned them before their completion, they acquired a reputation as unreliable partners in empire. In response, British officers developed a nearly universal contempt for native allies.” However, these four sources do not support the idea of widespread disdain. Williamson seems to have held this view, and wrote that the Cherokee were “pretended friends of the British” and suggested that “the Iroquois, who were before our Friends . . . have indeed deserted us.” While an earlier history of desertion may have influenced Williamson’s harsh views of the Iroquois as unreliable allies, the three other sources analyzed here do not suggest universal contempt as Shannon argued.

The sources suggest that Johnson, Smith, and Lee viewed the alliance between Britain and the Six Nations as valuable. Johnson assured a sachem named Abraham, Theyanoguin’s brother, “I am fully convinced of your sincerity and attachment to his Majesty’s interest,” at a private meeting with Mohawk leaders in 1756. Similarly, Smith commented on Britain’s Indigenous allies’ “Bravery, Fidelity, and Friendship” and wrote of overall “Indian humanity, integrity, and fidelity towards their allies.” To further show the value of the Six Nations as allies, Smith provided an excerpt of what one Mohawk warrior apparently proclaimed to the French Governor: “We can never know peace with you while you are at war with the British. We will stand or fall together, as is informed with one soul, animated with one Blood, . . . as well as linked in one Chain.” Like Johnson and Smith, Lee also saw the value in the Six Nations’ alliance, but did not attribute their friendship to a fundamental love of Britain. He commented that the Mohawks were their most “brave and deserving allies” and that Britain owed them great appreciation for convincing the other five nations in the Confederacy to stay neutral throughout the war. Yet, Lee explained that the Six Nations were only faithful for their own interests. To prove this, Lee included the words of a French-allied Mississauga sachem: “Do not contribute [our killings] to a particular antipathy we have to you, or any partiality and attachment to the French . . . whoever is in possession of this strong castle of Niagara, must effectually command the Messasagas.” Thus, Lee believed the Six Nations to be loyal allies, but only as long as the British maintained control over the area in which they lived. While Williamson expressed contempt and saw the Six Nations as deserters and disloyal, the other three men argued that they were faithful allies, but provided different justifications for their allegiance to Britain.

The final competing opinion found among these British documents concerned the Six Nations’ measure of independence. According to Shannon, it was common for

31 Ibid., 35.
32 Ibid., 7-8.
33 An Account of Conferences Held, and Treaties Made, 32.
34 Peter Williamson, French and Indian Cruelty, 16.
37 Peter Williamson, French and Indian Cruelty, 102.
38 An Account of Conferences Held, and Treaties Made, 22.
39 William Smith, Some Account of the North-American Indians, 35.
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 32.
colonial administrators to treat their Indian allies as simply another British regiment, and subject them to British-style leadership. He cited the governor of Massachusetts Bay, William Shirley, as an example of this style of administration as Shirley perceived the Iroquois as equivalent to provincial recruits, and expected them to be willing to endure hard labour and discipline in exchange for a regular pay. Shirley soon realized his assumptions were incorrect, when “the Iroquois refused to serve as cannon fodder [and] the Niagara campaign stalled at Fort Oswego.” While Shirley may have perceived the Six Nations as dependents, this perception was not held by all British officials. For instance, Lee argued that “the Indians are a people who of all others abhor the thoughts of being dependents.” Yet, he also commented on the fact that their independence relied on there being more than one European power in North America, implying that their status as dependents was not inevitably permanent.

Similarly, Johnson acknowledged that the Six Nations were not simply another British regiment. Johnson conducted diplomacy with Britain’s Indigenous allies on a nation-to-nation basis and addressed them as “brethren,” which according to historian Jon Parmenter, signified a relationship between equals. Even though Johnson tried to convince the surviving Mohawk to stay after suffering high casualties at Lake George, he let them leave, which appears to be evidence of Johnson’s acknowledgement that the Iroquois fought on their own terms. However, while Johnson seems to have viewed the Six Nations as independent, when speaking to the Iroquois sachems, he referred to King George II of Great Britain as “your Father the great king, who has nothing more at heart than the safety and welfare of you his faithful children.” Johnson may have viewed the Six Nations as equals to the colonists and British troops, but he seems to have understood his Indigenous allies as being subjects of Britain. It is evident that not all British officials saw the Six Nations as regular recruits as Shirley had, as Lee saw them as far from dependent. Additionally, at least in Johnson’s case, there seems to have been a grey area between dependent and independent regarding the status of the Six Nations during the war.

The lives of these four men exemplify the dramatically different views the British held of their Indigenous allies and how their experiences and agendas influenced these perceptions. For instance, Lee married the daughter of White Thunder, a Seneca chief, and was inducted into the tribe of the Bear. He published his letters to convince Lord Charlemont and other British officials of the importance of keeping Canada in the final treaties with France, so it is logical that he emphasized the warfare abilities of the Indigenous people that he argued may turn against the British if France stayed in North America. Smith’s position as an Anglican clergyman who wished to convince others to help convert his friendly Iroquois neighbours certainly motivated his decision to write about the Six Nations as peace-lovers. Williamson’s incentives for describing all Indigenous peoples as savage were undoubtedly influenced by the purpose of his book as a whole, as he was writing to the public for charitable financial support and thus needed to evoke an emotional and sympathetic reader response. The “unfortunates” genre such as Dafoe’s Robinson Crusoe may have also influenced Williamson’s autobiography, as historians have suggested that the entire narrative of his captivity was likely fabricated for the purpose of commercial success. Nevertheless, Williamson’s perceptions of the Indigenous peoples as barbaric and inhumane were circulating via his publication.

Personal agendas for writing about the Six Nations in a certain light are perhaps most obvious with William Johnson. He argued that they were intelligent and loyal friends, which is not surprising given that his career as an Indian agent depended on Britain’s intent to conduct diplomacy with the Six Nations. In fact, the introduction to his meeting transcripts proclaimed, “these sheets will sufficiently convince the impartial and intelligent Reader . . . of what farther service [Johnson] has been, and still may be, in treating with the heads of powerful Indian Nations.” To convince others of the legitimacy of his role in the war was also to solidify his access to many benefits that came with the job, such as various land grants from Iroquois neighbours like the thirteen thousand acre grant he accepted from the Mohawks of Canajoharie. He also charged the Crown 2.5 percent commission on the goods he sold as Superintendent. It should therefore be remembered that each author’s individual experiences with the Six Nations shaped their different perceptions, and that they all had underlying motivations, whether conscious or subconscious, for writing about Britain’s Indigenous allies in the way that they did.

44 Ibid., 86.
45 Charles Lee, The Importance of Canada Considered, 17.
47 Timothy J. Shannon, “War, Diplomacy, and Culture,” 84.
48 An Account of Conferences Held, and Treaties Made, 22.

52 An Account of Conferences Held, and Treaties Made, iii.
53 Julian Gwyn, “Johnson, Sir William.”
54 Ibid.
What do these contradicting opinions contribute to the study of the Seven Years’ War? There was not one comprehensive British view of their Indigenous allies. If the British perception of the Six Nations Iroquois was to be learned from these sources alone, it would be concluded that the British viewed them as barbarous as well as peace-loving, that the Six Nations succeeded at war due to their strategic skill and policies as well as their savage-like ability to endure pain, and that the British understood them as deserting, unfaithful allies, as well as the most loyal friends full of dignity. Even more significant is the fact that these perceptions were not simply documented in private diaries and letters, but that they were published. During the Seven Years’ War, then, there were internal conflicts of ideas and competing perceptions among the British population about their Indigenous allies that were not simply confined to their significance as war allies. These competing views of Indigenous peoples were also about the overall understanding that individuals had of Britain’s imperial colonies and their relationship with the native inhabitants of the land they conquered. Lee not only saw the Six Nations as competent allies, but also as a barrier in the overall expansion of the empire in North America: “these wise gentry who dream of forming a frontier in America, mean I suppose that we should retain the east, the forts of the south side of the lakes Ontario and Erie . . . ; a possibility of maintaining which against the inclinations of the Indians is certainly chimerical.”

Contrarily, Johnson believed the Six Nations to be subjects under the larger British nation with whom friendly relationships fostered the empire’s growth. Smith saw the Six Nations as not only peace-loving allies during wartime, but as potential individuals to be ‘saved’ and ‘civilized’ in Britain’s expanding North American colonies. Contrarily, Peter Williamson believed all Indigenous peoples in North America to be far too different from the British population to fit within his idea of what the Empire should be. These sources reveal that there was not a single British perception of their Six Nations allies during the Seven Years’ War, and most importantly, that there was a conflict within imperial ideology circulating among prominent British individuals. During and immediately after the conflict, British society had not reached consensus regarding the type of empire the Crown was creating. These competing opinions reflect the ongoing discussion of the uncertain position held by Indigenous peoples in British North America.

56 William Smith, Some Account of the North-American Indians, 41.
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