

Peace Is on the Ballot: Polarization and the Colombian Peace Process

John P. Hayes*

Abstract

On October 2nd 2016, Colombian voters rejected a referendum on the peace agreement between the federal government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Contrary to advance polling and preliminary estimates in national and international news media, the “No” vote won by a tight margin, thus rejecting a peace deal that would have brought an end to the longest civil war in the Western hemisphere. This paper examines the intersections of civil society and the political groups most actively involved in the peace process in Colombia, beginning in the 1980s and leading to the 2016 referendum. The findings are twofold: first, civil society has played an integral role in both the endurance and the hindrance of the peace process from its beginnings in 1980s up to the present day, through electoral support of independent candidates and by mobilization of special interest groups. Second, the 2016 referendum results share exceptional demographic and geographic correlations with the results of the 2014 presidential election. This suggests the peace referendum was highly politicized and split along the lines of partisanship at the highest echelons of Colombian democracy.

Keywords: Colombia, FARC, peace, civil war, civil society, polarization

Introduction

On October 2, 2016, Colombian voters rejected a referendum on the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC). The FARC are a Marxist rebel group that began an armed struggle against the Colombian government in the 1960s, based on economic grievances rooted in stark wealth and land ownership inequality. The FARC appeal most to landless peasants living in the most remote corners of the nation, and have sustained over five decades of war against the Colombian government. Contrary to most international news media polling, the “No” vote won by a tight margin, thus rejecting a peace

deal that would have brought an end to the longest running civil war in the Western hemisphere. With a voter turnout under forty percent, the results were 50.21% for “No” to 49.79% for “Yes” (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 2016). The FARC appear undivided in accepting the terms of the current peace deal and participating in the truth and justice tribunals. However, the question of institutionalizing peace ultimately stood with the Colombian electorate, which has fallen between two radically divergent opinions on the question of recognizing the FARC as political agents. Within these factions exist a plethora of civil society groups representing many different social and economic forces. By examining the state and non-state actors involved, this paper asks: how has the role of civil society influenced national security policy in regards to ending the violent conflict with the FARC? Findings indicate that civil society

*Department of Political Studies, College of Arts and Science, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada
Correspondence: joh352@mail.usask.ca

groups have played an integral role in both the endurance and the hindrance of the peace process, and that there is a strong correlation between the referendum results from October 2, 2016 and the results of the 2014 presidential election. This suggests the peace referendum was highly politicized and transcended the conflict in question. Instead, the peace talks have become an epistemological assessment of both modern Colombian governance and conflicting identities of nationhood in a time of war, the results of which show an electorate deeply split along party lines at the highest levels of Colombian democracy.

What Comprises Colombian Civil Society?

It is important to define 'civil society' and to identify influential players that comprise civil society in Colombia. Joseph Buttgieg's (1995) review of political theorist Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* provides an effective conception of civil society that applies to modern nation states. Gramsci supports the distinction between civil and political society, positing that civil society is as equally important to states as political actors (Buttgieg 1995). Civil groups influence politics indirectly, meaning that they seek to change government policy without formally taking power themselves, insofar as they can sway the political actors that *do* seek political control (Buttgieg 1995). Former High Commissioner for Peace, Daniel Garcia-Peña Jaramillo (2007), categorizes civil society similarly to the Gramscian perspective and points to a diverse range of non-state actors, including business elites, landowners, foreign investors, the Catholic Church, Evangelical churches, labour unions, and peace activists.¹ While all of these groups continually blur the lines between civil and political society, the categorization is helpful in understanding the influence of non-state actors on the peace efforts and political parties, the ability of the political class to call on these groups to rally behind their causes, and the overall interplay of groups involved in Colombian democracy. It is against this backdrop that the peace process transcends the internal conflict in question and becomes the battleground for national political leaders to display their divergent visions of a strong and legitimate Colombian state.

Roots of Civil War: Historical and Economic Conditions

While Colombia is hailed as the longest standing democracy in Latin America, contemporary political history shows a legacy of violent conflict within Colombia's borders. In certain historical instances, violent internal conflict has exposed the weakness of national political institutions, which are integral to modern democratic governance. The bipartisan political culture of present day takes root in the bitterly violent conflict of *La Violencia* (1948-1958) between liberals and conservatives which became so violent that it nearly resulted in national sociopolitical dissolution (Tickner 2007). Less than a decade later, Marxist insurgencies of the Cold War era (notably, the FARC) and their reactionary paramilitary adversaries, financed by land owning elites, set the impetus for civil war (Paley 2014; Peceny and Durnan 2006; Ulloa 2014). The grievances of the FARC and other Marxist insurgencies such as the *Ejército de liberación nacional* (National Liberation Army, or ELN) and smaller groups were rooted in legacies of the *latifundio* (large estate) system (Pearce 1990). While the *latifundio* has a long history dating back to the colonial period, the catalyst for armed struggle by the FARC was to challenge the Colombian government's economic and land reform program of the 1960s (Paley 2014). In essence, the Colombian government interpreted land tenure laws in a way that dispossessed hundreds of thousands of peasants from their lands, turning ownership rights over to agricultural industrialists, complete with subsidy programs to boost productivity and output for domestic and international markets (Pearce 1990). It was a political campaign that antagonized preexisting land access inequality in a dominantly agrarian society. The FARC ascended from this context as an appealing voice of the dispossessed peasantry in the most remote corners of the nation, in an epoch when Marxist fervor was already fomenting throughout Latin America. However, given the unbelievable length and scope of the war in Colombia, both the economic context and the international political world order have changed dramatically through the decades, and with it, public sentiment.

The overall condition of insecurity has cultivated an offensive military stance by the government, in many cases fulfilling both national economic projects and land dispossession through a discursive framework of conflict resolution (Paley 2014; Rojas 2009).² While the FARC have

¹ Daniel Garcia-Peña Jaramillo (2007) provides particularly robust knowledge of the earliest stages of the peace talks and the involvement of civil society groups, focusing primarily on the presidential administrations of Ernesto Samper and Andrés Pastrana (1994-2002). For further reading, see: Garcia-Peña 2007.

² Compelling literature has emerged in light of policy shifts in the Colombian conflict at the turn of the century that considers the state's national security policy as privileging the interests of transnational capitalism. Thus, the internal conflict in question is seen as a mechanism by which the government can displace and

never come close to overthrowing the government, they have sustained five decades of armed struggle and continue to elude the state's persistent offensives and far superior military capabilities (Johnson and Jonsson 2013). As a result, many citizens view the government as an equal perpetrator of violence and land dispossession, with little to offer in terms of stability and security (Paley 2014; Rojas 2009). The stalemate has resulted in over 220,000 lives lost, over seven million internally displaced persons, and a considerable amount of state frustration that has become the focal point of national policy for consecutive presidential administrations (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013). For political elites, there is immense personal investment in how the conflict is addressed, given the influence that civil society has on Colombian party politics.

Divergences in National Security Policies (1994-Present Day)

The executive branch in Colombia has broad responsibilities in national security issues (Garcia-Peña 2007). For the purposes of understanding how close Colombia came to legislating the peace agreement in October 2016, it is helpful to employ a comparative analysis of national security policy of the four most recent presidential administrations of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), and Juan Manuel Santos (2010-present). The transference of executive power between these administrations at times reflects significant policy divergences between presidents as a direct result of the political will of the electorate and influential civil society groups. These changes in course have had irreversible effects on the overarching objective of ending the internal violent conflict (Avilés 2006). This paper categorizes three main approaches the government has taken in regards to resolving hostilities with the FARC: one, informal negotiations with participation from state actors and civil society; two, formal institutionalization of the peace talks within national government; and three, attempting to defeat the FARC through military offensives and non-negotiable terms such as a unilateral ceasefire and release of all imprisoned members of Colombia's military.

Under President Samper, the government recognized the FARC as legitimate political actors with grounded ideological interpretations of national social inequality, and began to pursue non-violent means of achieving peace through talks and negotiations. First, the Presidential Peace Advisory was transformed into a cabinet

level position and renamed 'Office of the High Commissioner for Peace' (Garcia-Peña 2007). Samper was willing to pursue negotiations with the FARC that were at odds with the positions of the military, based on financial support and pressure from civil interests within the national oil and gas sector (Avilés 2006). During the 1990s, Colombia raised oil and gas production by 78%, becoming the fourth largest exporter of oil in South America. Consequently, the FARC, ELN, and smaller insurgent groups would bomb energy sector infrastructure as a method of extorting finances (Avilés 2006). A discourse emerged among concerned business and labour groups cautioning that much was at stake economically. Diverse sectors of civil society responded, culminating in the creation of the National Peace Council in 1998.³ Among the council were representatives from the energy sector, which included oil workers and the labour unions representing them, finance sector representatives, entrepreneurs, along with the Catholic Church (Garcia-Peña 2007; Redepaz 2014). This early framework for peace was guided by the contemporary neoliberal economic paradigm, resulting from a cost-benefit framework employed by non-state actors with vested interests in preserving order.

Following the transition of executive power in 1998, peace talks broke down for a number of reasons. Under Samper, violent conflict continued with the FARC while the talks were happening, displaying a clear lack of commitment to negotiation by both sides. Incumbent President Pastrana demanded an unconditional disarming of the FARC before any talks were to happen, which did not fare well with the FARC.⁴ According to Daniel Garcia-Peña, President Pastrana's policy involved a great deal of improvisation on the part of the presidential team and a clear reform agenda was never set forth. Additionally, involvement of the United States increased in this period in the form of financial aid and technological support for Colombia's military (Johnson and Jonsson 2013; Garcia-Peña 2007; Paley 2014). The attacks of September 11th, 2001 marked a significant change in U.S. policy in the Americas, pivoting from the "War on Drugs" to the "War on Terror" (Avilés 2006; Paley 2014). The international voice of the U.S. in Colombian politics at this time, combined with repeated shortcomings in the peace talks and a general loss of faith in the process by the Colombian people, set the impetus for a major policy shift by the executive branch in 2002.

Under the Presidency of Álvaro Uribe, a decidedly different attitude was taken on how to handle the internal

dispossess the citizenry of land, wealth, and access to resources to favour the private sector. For further reading, see Paley 2014; Rojas 2009.

³ For an overview of the 1998 National Peace Council, see: Daniel Garcia-Peña Jaramillo 2007.

⁴ The FARC have maintained the same general terms for negotiations through several administrations (Yagoub 2016). For a detailed overview of their terms, see www.insightcrime.org

conflict. He campaigned on a hardline of defeating the FARC through direct military confrontation (Johnson and Jonsson 2013; Rojas 2009). After witnessing failed attempts at negotiations in past presidencies, business groups in Colombia rallied behind Uribe. Himself the offspring of a wealthy ranching family, Uribe led an aggressive campaign to fuel public sentiment that peace talks were not the answer (Avilés 2006). Between 2002 and 2008, the size of Colombia's military forces doubled (Avilés 2006; Johnson and Jonsson 2013), and the U.S. financial support to the Colombian government shifted from \$317 million in 1999, to roughly \$750 million a year starting in 2001 (Peceny and Durnan 2006). Plan Colombia, an anti-insurgent counternarcotics aid and military mission instituted by U.S. President Clinton, was expanded under the Bush administration during President Uribe's time in office. The results of the military campaign were viewed by many analysts of the conflict as successful. FARC forces were culled from 17,000 in 2002 to 8,500 troops in 2009, and simultaneously, national homicide rates and cases of kidnapping dwindled significantly (Johnson and Jonsson 2013). This correlation shows that the military spending stimulus of Plan Colombia effected other realms of national security beyond the frontlines of the war with the FARC. The GDP also grew by 6.8%, the largest increase since the 1970s (Rojas 2009). Weakening the FARC overwhelmingly benefitted Uribe and the independent, center-right political movement, *Primero Colombia* (Colombia First), allowing for Uribe's easy reelection in 2006. Through his eight-year tenure, he enjoyed a 60% approval rating, peaking at 87% in June 2008 (Rojas 2009). Despite perceived successes and significant decreases in violence under Álvaro Uribe, internal conflict has persisted in Colombia and now stands at an impasse.

What has changed specifically among civil society groups to witness such a marked shift from engagement in mobilizing for peace during the 1990s towards popular support for militarism in the following decade? Cristina Rojas, a political scientist that studies Colombian governance, explores how citizens in the Uribe years traded active participation in political movements for security (2009) and that the impetus was the *Primero Colombia* citizen's movement, an independent movement centered around the paternalism of President Uribe (2009). Instead of falling into the trappings of the historical bipartisan rivalry pitting liberals against conservatives, Rojas exhibits how the *Primero Colombia* campaign evoked a communitarian view of nationhood centered around a *patrimonio* (patriarch), in this case, Álvaro Uribe. For those in the movement, the fundamental understanding of the national destiny transcends all traditional partisan political rivalries and is instead an existential struggle between democracy and terrorism (2009). For example, while the FARC were granted political recognition during the Samper

and Pastrana administrations of the 1990s, Uribe rejected the notion that Colombia was in a civil war altogether. Instead, he framed the internal conflict as the nation state battling terrorism (the FARC): a fundamental departure from the former national political dialogue, but in line with the discourse of the United States led War on Terror.

Despite Uribe's popularity, he did not appoint a successor charismatic enough to carry his militaristic national policy through to a third term. In the context of twenty-first century Latin American politics, there has been a regional pattern in which a popular leader will groom a close ally to continue their work. For example, in neighboring Venezuela, the late Hugo Chavez's transfer of power to Nicolas Maduro, or President Lula da Silva's handpicked successor, Dilma Rousseff, who led the Worker's Party in Brazil to another term occupying the executive post. With the lack of a *caudillo* (strong man) to pick up on Uribe's work, the rise of Juan Manuel Santos to the presidency displays a confusing set of policy contradictions. Although Santos is now a political adversary of Uribe, his ascension in Colombian politics is largely attributed to his tenure as Uribe's former minister of defense (2006-2009) at a time when Plan Colombia was at its apex and militarism was the overarching approach to the internal conflict (Paley 2014). While the Santos Presidency and the peace talks are synonymous, he remains committed to Plan Colombia, which details the principle of narcotics exterminations through force, and the militarization of departments with a large FARC presence (LaFuente 2016; Paley 2016). According to a Ministerio de Defensa (Ministry of Defence) 2013 report, "Achievements of Integral Policy of Security and Defense for Prosperity," the number one priority in the current national defense strategy is to achieve "a historic minimization of the national production of narcotics."⁵ Pro-peace groups have focused on the fact that, under Santos, the peace talks have resumed. However, many in the "Yes" movement ignore the realities of ongoing violence in the hinterlands of the nation that persist under the pretense of narcotics extermination, which ultimately obscures civil-military conflicts regarding land ownership and national resources. (Paley 2014). While fighting the FARC might be coming to a close, militarization remains at historically high levels.

⁵ For a complete overview of the Colombian national defense agenda and budget under President Santos, see: Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia 2013.

Polarization of the Colombian Electorate

The victory of Santos in 2014 was very narrow, exposing the increasing polarization of Colombian electoral politics. However, the pattern of single term presidencies changing to double terms under Uribe and now under Santos suggests that Colombian democracy is entering a phase that, building on Rojas's (2009) concept of *patrimonio* politics, entrusts the national project to *caudillos* to carry out their political plan over the maximum two terms. President Uribe was in office when electoral reform occurred in 2005, ratifying Article 197 of the Colombian constitution from allowing one, non-renewable term to two terms for a president (Avance Jurídico Casa Editorial Ltda, 2016). Every election since has resulted in a two-term presidency, if the candidate is eligible. While the pattern is based only on the past four elections, it is worth noting when observing future elections. The *caudillo* phenomenon implicates Colombia's reputation as Latin America's oldest democracy and jeopardizes the role the electorate has in influencing national policy. With broad constitutional powers vested in the president, this can undermine the role of civil society groups in influencing national security policy, the long term prospect of peace, and democracy in general.

A strong indicator of the polarization in electoral politics and among civil groups is the use of semantics when describing actors involved in the violent conflict. How groups label the FARC, whether as an illegal group, terrorists, narcoterrorists, guerrillas, revolutionaries, or otherwise, carry unique connotations that exhibit personal and group bias. On October 19, 2016, Álvaro Uribe penned an op-ed for *The Wall Street Journal* where he clearly displays his preferred nomenclature for the FARC as "Marxist Narcoterrorists." Conversely, in an interview with Colombian newspaper *El País* on September 4, 2016, President Santos employs vague and politically neutral semantics, referencing the FARC as "Guerrillas." Indeed, the FARC is an armed rebel organization with ties to drug running, kidnapping, and other illegal activities. However, the extent to which illegal activity funds their operation is largely speculative. *Insight Crime*, a non-profit research institution and socio-legal online review covering Latin American politics, estimates that the FARC generates only 2.5% of their total income from the drug trade. Regardless of the extent to which they finance their group through illegal means, political factions supporting or opposing the peace process can ultimately define the FARC as they see fit in order to fulfill their objectives. Institutionalizing the FARC as a political party and guaranteeing them ten seats in national congress over two four year terms has proven to be a deal breaker for the opposition *Centro Democrático* (Democratic Centre, or CD) party, which is the recently

emerged anti-peace talk coalition party (LaFuente 2016; Yaboub 2016). Likewise, if the government were to rescind that concession, then the FARC would likely leave the peace talks once again (Yaboub 2016). From the onset of pursuing diplomacy for peace, political recognition of the FARC and their institutionalization as a national party has always been an essential element for getting the group to the negotiating table.

A comparison of the electoral results of the 2014 Presidential election and the referendum results of October 2, 2016 displays that polarization of the referendum is strongly correlated with partisanship. The defeat of the referendum is largely attributed to the political force of former President Uribe and his pivotal role in the CD.⁶ The CD and influential civil groups supporting them, primarily Evangelical churches and landowners in the cattle ranching and coffee producing departments of central Colombia, consider the current terms and concessions of the peace talks too lenient on the FARC and too defeatist given the significant weakening of the FARC during Uribe's presidency.⁷ Conversely, current President Juan Manuel Santos has championed the peace talks and based his re-election in 2014 around ending the violent conflict. Santos draws his support from the departments in Colombia most directly affected by the violence and civil interest groups tired of the decades old conflict. Almost every department that Santos and the independent *Unidad Nacional* (National Unity) party won in the 2014 Presidential election voted "Yes" on October 2, 2016 when answering the following question: "Do you support the final agreement to end the conflict and the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace?" According to results posted on the *Registraduría Nacional de Estado Civil* (National Registrar of Civil Society), the nonpartisan government agency tasked with monitoring voter registration and electoral results, Santos drew strong support from the capital city of Bogotá and coastal departments such as Bolívar, Cesar, La Guajira, Sucre, and Córdoba. Much of his support along the coast came from the strong holdings of left-wing governors that support the pro-peace talk *Unidad Nacional* (national unity) party (Neuman 2016). It is also essential to remember that departments most affected by war with the FARC through the most intense spells of violence during Plan Colombia, notably Choco, Putumayo, and Nariño, decisively voted "Yes" in many cases by margins surpassing two-thirds of the vote (Finzi 2016). The "No" vote won overwhelmingly in rural departments where the right-wing CD party won in 2014, notably Meta, Casanare, coffee-producing

⁶ For a comprehensive description of the CD's support base, see: *Semana*.

⁷ For a quantitative analysis of Uribe's national security policy regarding the FARC and narcotics extermination, see Johnson and Jonsson 2013.

departments of the Andean region, and Antioquia (Finzi 2016). Antioquia is notable as Úrbe was a former governor, and the capital city of the department, Medellín, is the former stronghold of the country's most powerful drug cartel during the 1980s. As a result, Antioquia has become a bastion of conservative support for the CD, Plan Colombia, and the general anti-narcotics approach to exterminating the internal conflict. Unsurprisingly, Medellín voted 64% "No."

Conclusion

With the defeat of the referendum, the road ahead is uncertain. The effort will surely define Juan Manuel Santos's legacy and also determine any hope of sustained cohesion among the *Unidad Nacional* in the lead up to the 2018 presidential elections. Path dependence now plagues Santos' final two years in office as the essential feature in continuing to pursue institutionalized peace is also the movement's Achilles heel: convincing the Colombian public of the idea that the FARC are political, not criminal agents. The FARC leadership is still determined to find a diplomatic solution out of the conflict and remain committed to disarmament under United Nations supervision, provided the basic terms of the deal do not unravel in the months ahead. For many Colombians, it is a tough pill to swallow, as the FARC uprising fifty-two years ago means that a majority of citizens have never experienced national peace. Furthermore, it is quixotic for the revolutionary army to march forward if there is little to no revolutionary fervour flowing among the population. However, departments enduring decades caught in the crossfire, experiencing internal displacement and the militarization of daily life have voted overwhelmingly in support of peace.

Regardless of the very narrow victory of the "No" vote, it would be wise for opponents of the peace deal to acknowledge that, after decades of U.S. technical, financial, logistical, and military support, the FARC has not been defeated and the prospect of a military solution does not appear any more promising going forward. Therefore, in the simplest terms of ending the war, peace might well be the only solution. In areas far from the frontlines of the internal conflict, citizens want change in their democracy and a change to the government's priorities. For Colombians that have endured decades of high rates of the national GDP spent on military and security projects, domestic issues are emerging at the forefront of the national political agenda. Conversely, it would be wise of the "Yes" faction to realize that peace will not come easily, even with the FARC laying down their arms and joining the political arena. The ELN and other small insurgencies still pursue armed struggle in the name of the very same grievances that the FARC have fought for since the 1960s. Public policy regarding land and resource rights, including

the uneven development of the national wealth, shows that the underlying motives for conflict still persist. Further, what happens to the extensively armed and organized paramilitaries, groups that by some estimates are responsible for over 75% of all conflict related fatalities, is another major factor in the sustainability of peace. As other Latin American peace processes illustrate, namely Guatemala and El Salvador in the 1990s, demobilizing and assimilating armed groups into civilian life is often easier said than done. In a deeply polarized country, the war of words will likely continue past the election in 2018, as efforts by civil society groups to promote their vision of a peaceful Colombia will surely endure.

Afterword

On November 24th, 2016 the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the opposition CD, led by Álvaro Úrbe, ratified the peace agreement in national congress, with concessions made to those skeptical of the peace deal that supported the "No" camp. The CD maintains their position that the peace deal unfairly grants amnesty to FARC rebels that ought to be convicted for their war crimes. However, the governing coalition of Juan Manuel Santos has a majority in national congress and passed the peace deal on December 6, 2016. Doing so rescinded the President's guarantee, albeit only an informal one, that the electorate would have the final word on the matter. That same day, the FARC encampments began moving to demobilization zones where they will hand over munitions to United Nations over the next six months (The Economist 2016). This likely marks the beginning of the end of the conflict, although much of the institutionalization of the peace begins in congress. Legislation regarding amnesty for FARC agents is set up to take over a year, which will spill into the campaign season for the 2018 Presidential elections. Unless Santos' *Unidad Nacional* coalition can implement a fast-tracking of the voting and deliberation process in congress, amnesty will become a centerpiece of the presidential campaign. If a "No" factionalist runs for President, then finalizing the peace talks will be threatened. In the interim, the matter is now a political battle to be fought in congress. Civil society has entrenched itself on both sides of the aisle, and it is now up to the mechanisms of the Colombian legislature to determine if the peace lasts.

Reference List

- Avance Jurídico Casa Editorial Limitada. 2016. "Leyes desde 1992: Vigencia Expresa y Sentencias de Constitucionalidad." Last modified September 23, 2016. http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/constitucion_politica_1991_proo6.html#197
- Avilés, William. 2006. *Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Buttigieg, Joseph A. 1995. "Gramsci on Civil Society." *boundary 2*, 22 (3): 1-32
- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. 2013. "¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra Y Dignidad" *Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica*. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional 2013. <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/bastaya-colombia-memorias-de-guerra-y-dignidad-2015.pdf>
- The Economist*. 2016. "A Tumultuous Final Chapter: Colombia's peace deal has taken effect, but the country remains divided." *The Economist*. December 10. <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21711526-governments-pragmatic-decision-not-call-second-referendum-comes-cost-colombias>
- Finzi, Giacomo. 2016. "Colombia is Divided...Even When It Comes to Peace." *The Dawn News*. Last Modified October 2. <http://www.thedawn-news.org/2016/10/03/colombia-is-divided-even-when-it-comes-to-peace/>
- García-Peña Jaramillo, Daniel. 2007. "Colombia: In Search of a New Model for Conflict Resolution." In *Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia*, edited by Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón, 90-131. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Johnson, Kyle and Michael Jonsson. 2013. "Colombia: Ending the Forever War?." *Survival*, 55 (1): 67-86.
- Lafuente, Javier. 2016. "Juan Manuel Santos: Una justicia perfecta no permite la paz," *El País*. September 4. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/09/03/colombia/1472916991_531673.html
- Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia (MDC). 2013. "Logros de la Política Integral de Seguridad y Defensa para la Prosperidad." *Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia*: Bogotá.
- Neuman, William. 2014. "Colombian President Re-elected After a Race Challenging His Peace Negotiations." *The New York Times*. June 16.
- Paley, Dawn. 2014. *Drug War Capitalism*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Pearce, Jenny. 1990. *Colombia: Inside The Labyrinth*. New York: Monthly Press Review.
- Peceny, Mark and Michael Durnan. 2006. "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s." *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48 (2): 95-116.
- Red Nacional de Iniciativas Ciudadanas por la Paz y contra la Guerra. 2014. "Pacto Nacional por la Paz." *Red Nacional de Iniciativas Ciudadanas por la Paz y contra la Guerra*. December 18. <http://www.redepaz.org.co/index.php/pedagogia-para-la-paz/pacto-nacional>
- Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC). 2014. "Elección de Presidente y Vicepresidente - segunda vuelta Escrutinio Final." <http://www3.registraduria.gov.co/elecciones/elecciones2014/presidente/>
- Rojas, Cristina. 2009. "Securitising the State and Developing Social Insecurities: the securitisation of citizenship in contemporary Colombia." *Third World Quarterly*, 30 (1): 227-245.
- Semana*. 2016. "Cristianos: ¿El poder decisorio en la política?." *Semana*, October 29. <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/religion-inclina-la-balanza-politica-en-colombia/502530>
- Tickner, Arlene B. 2007. "U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia: Bizarre Side Effects of the 'War on Drugs.'" In *Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia*, edited by Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón, 90-131. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Ulloa, Fernando Cepeda. 2014. "¿Clientelismo = corrupción?" *El País*. March 28. <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/opinion/columna/fernando-cepeda-ulloa/clientelismo-corrupcion>
- Úrbe Vélez, Álvaro. 2016. "That Was No Way to Negotiate with Narcoterrorists." *The Wall Street Journal*. October 19. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/no-way-to-negotiate-with-narcoterrorists-1476916320>
- Yagoub, Mimi. 2016. "Can Opposing Sides Reach Consensus on Colombia Peace Process?" *Insight Crime*. October 14. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/can-farc-colombia-opposition-reach-consensus-peace-process>

